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Abstract
Behavior of apartment prices in the Russian cities following the ruble devaluation in Au-
gust 1998 diered markedly in dierent cities. In cities, where prices were denominated in
dollars, they fell slowly over time. In cities, where apartments were priced in rubles, the dollar-
equivalents fell rapidly with the exchange rate, stayed low for two to three years, and then
recovered rapidly when economy picked up. Such behavior is found to be consistent with a
sticky-price model with backward-looking agents. Sticky information model nds less support.
Finally, such behavior of prices is not consistent with forward-looking agents or 
exible prices.
1 Introduction
The Russian nancial crisis of August 1998, as any other major disruption of economic activity,
has produced a number of observations interesting to academic economists. One such striking
observation is behaviour of prices for apartments in dierent Russian cities. As noted rst by
Gennadiy Sternik from the Russian Guild of Realtors, prices of apartments in cities, where they
are quoted in rubles, the local currency, have behaved quite dierently from the prices in the cities,
where the denomination is in American dollars.1 Specically, in the "dollar" cities, prices fell quite
slowly and recovered slowly when the economy started to recover a couple of years later. In the ruble
cities, by contrast, the dollar-equivalents of the prices fell dramatically on impact, in September of
1998, together with the exchange rate, and stayed lower than in the dollar cities throughout the
period of low income.
This paper uses this observation as a natural experiment to test dierent models, which poten-
tially could explain such behavior of prices, and nds that only the model with sticky prices and
adaptive expectations is consistent with the data. A model with 
exible prices cannot be in line
The authors thank Gennadiy Sternik from the Russian Guild of Realtors for providing the data and insights. The
author can be contacted at Nakhimovskiy prospekt, 47, Oce 720, Moscow 117418, Russia, or at kstyrin@cer.ru
and ozamulin@cer.ru.
1Articles by Sternik describing this behavior can be found at http://www.realtymarket.ru
1with these observations, because such a model would predict identical behavior of prices in all cities.
The model with forward-looking price-setters also does not do well, as it fails, as usual, to replicate
the acceleration of in
ation of time of high income. Finally, the model with sticky information,
advocated recently by Mankiw and Reis (2002a, 2002b), also nds weaker support with the data,
although is not outright rejected.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the behavior of apartment prices and
introduces the reader to the general conditions in the Russian economy in 1998-2001. Then, Section
3 shows a simple sticky-price model with forward-looking and then adaptive expectations and
demonstrates that only the adaptive expectations version is consistent with the data. Section 4
builds a model based on sticky information and shows the results of corresponding empirical tests.
Section 5 then demonstrates that the 
exible model fails as well. Section 6 concludes.
2 Facts and Discussion
In August of 1998, Russia has suered a disastrous nancial crisis, which lead to a double real
devaluation of the ruble and a big fall in the real income. In
ation, which was virtually subdued
during the period of the "crawling peg" over 1995-1998, spiked up to a monthly 36% in September,
totaled 84% in all of 1998, and then slowly fell to about 18% in 2001. The exchange rate, held
at about 6.2 rubles per dollar until the devaluation, went to 16 rubles per dollar in September,
and then gradually climbed to about 30 rubles per dollar by the end of 2001. Thus, the original
devaluation was much stronger than the increase in the price level.
The real income, in turn, fell gradually by about 20%, reaching the trough in the rst half of
1999, and then recovering to pre-crisis levels by the end of 2001.
The behavior of apartment prices in 9 Russian cities is shown in Figure 2. These prices represent
the dollar equivalents of the averages per square meter on the secondary market, with December
1999 normalized to 100.2 In Kaliningrad, Nizhniy Novgorod, Moscow, St.Petersburg, and Tver
apartment have been priced in dollars, while in Novosibirsk, Omsk, Perm, and Ulyanovsk the
pricing has been traditionally done in rubles. This purely nominal dierence between the pricing
practices appears to have a huge eect on the dynamics. Thus, in the dollar cities, the fall of prices
has been much slower and smaller in magnitude than in the ruble cities, giving immediate support
to the hypothesis that the prices have been rigid in the currency, in which they are quoted. The
dollar prices in the dollar cities have not changed very much on impact, nor did the ruble prices in
ruble cities. Instead, the dollar-equivalents of the ruble prices fell immediately simply because the
exchange rate grew almost threefold between August and September 1998.
Of course, the distribution of the dollar-pricing and ruble-pricing cities is far from random, which
sheds doubt on whether the above observation can be used as a true natural experiment. After
all, the dollar cities do seem to be more westernized in general, so they may be subject to dierent
dynamics than the more provincial ruble cities. Thus, the denomination of prices is potentially a
2In Russia, it is customary to own apartments, rather than rent them.
































Source: The Russian Guild of Realtors.
highly endogenous variable. However, these fears do not disturb us very much. First of all, the
dynamics of income in dierent cities do not show any variations that can explain dierent price
behavior within those cities. Besides, we do use regional, as well as aggregate incomes in regressions
that follow, so income eects are caught. Second, Levina and Zamulin (2002) have shown that an
economy or an individual market can be stuck in a dollar-pricing equilibrium after a period of high
in
ation, and no one would be willing to unilaterally switch to ruble pricing even after in
ation is
subdued, for fears of deviating far from the competitors' prices with 
uctuations of the exchange
rate. Thus, we believe that dierent cities are simply caught in dierent equilibria after the high
in
ation of early 1990s, and hence the denomination of prices is no longer as endogenous as may
seem.
3 Sticky price models
The sticky price model is based on that of Kimball (1995), which in turn models the price-setting
process following Calvo (1983). It is assumed that the sellers adjust their price at a stochastic
3rate . Of course, for the secondary apartment markets, the sale of an apartment is a one-time
event, and the seller may be keeping the price constant until the apartment is sold; however, she
can certainly adjust the price after a while if she observes that the apartment is not selling for the
price quoted from the start. For the primary market, apartments are a standard product, so their
price is adjusted up and down on regular basis.
We assume that in each period there is an unobservable instantaneous "desired price" p# (given
in logarithm) common to all. This is the price that maximizes prots of rms in the primary market
and maximizes utility of sellers on the secondary market, who desire to sell their apartment fast on
the one hand, and earn as much money as possible on the other. We do not model this maximization




t + (qt    q) = pa
t + qt; (1)
where pa
t is the average apartment price level, qt is the total demand for apartments at time t,
and  q is the demand at the natural level of total income, here normalized to zero in logarithm.
Expression (1) says that the instantaneously optimal price for each apartment relates to the average
market price and excess demand. At the time of high demand, a seller would prefer to quote a price
somewhat above the average, at the time of low demand - below average. Hence, the parameter
 denotes "real price rigidity" in the sense of Ball and Romer (1990): the parameter shows how
much the optimal price depends on the real demand as opposed to prices of the competitors.
The second expression of the model is the total demand on the apartment markets. It is assumed
that the total demand for apartments is CES in the total income and relative price, and is thus
given in logarithmic form by
qt = yt   
(pa
t   pt); (2)
where yt is the total income of the households in the city, while pt is the overall price level.
The third equation shows the behavior of the apartment price level pa
t. Since on average each
period  sellers adjust their prices, then in each period the change in price level will equal this
fraction of price adjusters times the dierence between the current price level and the "reset" price
bt - the price set by the seller, who gets a chance to adjust at time t. Thus, in
ation in the apartment
market is determined by:
pa
t+1 = (bt+1   pa
t): (3)
The change of price is thus the reset price as of the current period less the price level inherited
from the previous period.
To close the model and produce testable implications, we need an expression for the reset price
bt. The way this price is determined heavily depends on the type of expectation, which the sellers
have. Here we consider two possibilities: forward-looking (rational) expectations, and adaptive
expectations. Let us consider both in turn.
43.1 Forward-looking expectations
In case the sellers are rational and forward-looking, they set the price keeping in mind expectations
of the future desired prices. A standard result is this literature is that the reset price equals
a weighted average of the future desired prices (for example, this result can be obtained from








From here, taking dierences, we obtain the following expression for the evolution of the reset price:
bt+1 = (bt+1   p
#
t ): (5)
Expression (5) allows us to derive a testable equation in terms of observable variables. For that,
take the rst dierence of (3), substitute (5) in, expand bt+1   p
#




t , and use
















t. Thus, we obtain results on the change of the in
ation rate of the apart-
ment prices. This result re
ects that in a sticky-price environment, in
ation should be high but
decelerating at times of high demand, and, correspondingly, low but rising when demand is weak.
The equation (6) can be tested for each city individually or for all combined. It is important to
realize, however, that the nominal variables have to be denominated in the currency, in which the
apartments are actually denominated in that city. The only nominal variable in (6) is the change
of in
ation on the left-hand side, so we make sure that the in
ation is take in the right currency.
The regressors, on the other hand, are all real variables.
The coecients need not be the same in this model, because the parameter , governing the
frequency of price adjustment, is endogenous to the rate of in
ation (Ball et al. 1988, Kiley 2000).
This coecient is expected to be greater in the ruble-pricing cities, as ruble in
ation has been high
throughout this period. Since both coecients in (6) are positive functions of  in absolute value,
we expect them to be bigger as well in the ruble cities.
The results are reported in Table 1. These results are obtained using the seasonaly adjusted
CPI and aggregate real income data from Goskomstat, the Russian federal statistical commission.
The results in Table 1 demonstrate that the rational expectations sticky price model does not
describe the data well. Most importantly, the coecient in front of income is positive, not negative,
in the regressions for ruble cities. This result is commonly obtained in tests of sticky-price models:
in
ation is found to be rising in times of boom, contrary to the prediction of the model. At the
same time, for dollar cities the coecient has a correct negative sign.
Even more disastrous is that the relative apartment price uniformly enters negatively and in
most cases signicantly, while the predicted sign is positive.
5Table 1: Testing the rational expectations model
Dependent variable a
t+1
City Constant yt+1 pa
t   pt
Panel regressions:
































































The problem with predicted falling in
ation at times of high income is normally xed by switch-
ing to either some form of adaptive expectations (), or by switching to sticky-information models,
recently proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2001b). We now turn to adaptive expectations, and
will consider sticky information in Section 4.
3.2 Adaptive expectations
The simplest method to introduce adaptive expectations is to simply assume that the sellers expect
the desired price in the future to be the same as the desired price today. This assumption gives a
very simple solution to the behavior of prices: reset price is simply replaced by the desired price,
for which there is a clear expression. The only problem is that such behavior, unlike the rational
expectations one, is dicult to reconcile with trend ruble in
ation, which was present in Russia in
the period under study, at least after the August 1998 crisis. A way to x that problem is then to
assume that each seller, when setting the price, adds an increment of the current in
ation rate in
6the country to the reset price, otherwise obtained from this form of static expectations.
Thus, the expressions for the reset price, combined with (1) are
bt = pa
t + qt (7)
in dollar cities, and
bt = pa




Thus, it is assumed that there is no trend in
ation in dollars, while each seller in a ruble city adds
the current in
ation times 1= - the length of time during which her price is expected to be xed.




t   pt) + yt+1 (9)
for the dollar cities, and
pa
t+1   pt+1 =  
(pa
t   pt) + yt+1 (10)
for the ruble cities. These equations are quite intuitive. The apartment prices grow when their
relative price is low and when the demand is high. They fall when the opposite is true.
Once again, the coecient for the ruble cities are expected to be greater, as sellers must be
adjusting their prices more frequently in an in
ationary environment.
The results of the estimation of (9) and (10) are shown in Table 2. These results are reported
both using the aggregate Russian money income, and regional money incomes of the corresponding
cities. Although the regional incomes may seem to be a better variable to use, the quality of
measurement of regional income, especially at monthly frequencies, is very questionable. Hence,
we report the results obtained both with the aggregate, which is supposedly easier to measure, and
the regional incomes. The results do not seem to depend greatly on this choice of income measure.
It is immediately seen that the model with adaptive expectations does much better than the
model with rational expectations. Indeed, for panel estimation, all of the coecients are signicant
and have the correct sign. For individual cities, coecients are not always signicant, but the sign
is always as predicted. As expected, the coecients for ruble cities are all bigger in absolute value
than those for dollar cities.
4 Sticky information
Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2001b) propose an alternative explanation for the apparent slow response
of the aggregate price level to changes in the economic environment. They assume that individual
sellers face some costs of obtaining information necessary for price formation. The existence of
such information costs implies that an individual price-setter updates her information occasionally,
from time to time, rather than in a continuous manner. After buying a new portion of information,
the seller resets the whole trajectory of the price for her product, which will be in force until the
7Table 2: Testing the adaptive expectations model
Dependent variable pa
t+1 for dollar cities, pa
t+1   pt+1 for ruble cities
Using aggregate income Using regional income
City Constant yt+1 pa
t   pt Constant yt+1 pa
t   pt
Panel regressions:






























































































































next resetting. The sticky information model is thus a multi-period generalization of Fischer (1977)
model with predetermined prices.
To be specic, assume that every period only a fraction  of sellers updates their information
about macroeconomic conditions and adjusts optimal, or "desired" price paths. At time t, the





where Et s() denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information available at time
t   s and p
#
t is the "desired price" at time t. Then the aggregate price level on the market for













t + qt); (13)










t + qt) (14)
where, according to (2),
qt = yt   
(pa
t   pt): (15)
Taking the rst dierence of qt, we get
qt = yt   
(a
t   t): (16)











t + (yt   
(a
t   t))): (17)
We can interpret (17) as a stochastic dierence equation for the determination of the relative, or
real price for the apartments, pa
t   pt, where the processes for t and yt are exogenously given.
Assume that t and yt are stationary and follow independent AR(1) processes. Then we can
solve the equation (17). The solution takes the form:
pa
t   pt =
1 X
s=0
(syt s +  st s) (18)
where coecients fsg1
s=0 and f sg1
s=0 are expressed in terms of structural parameters of the
model and the parameters of underlying autoregression processes for yt and t. The exact expres-
sions can be found using the method of undetermined coecients, and the parameters in front of


















The signs of these coecients are intuitive. Increase in income stimulates those who update infor-
mation today to adjust their price upward, hence the positive sign. A surprise increase in overall
in
ation, on the other hand, leaves the predetermined apartment prices of this period behind the
overall price level.
9Table 3: Testing the sticky information model: xed-eect panel-data regressions
Dependent variable pa
i;t   pt











































































In the case of dollar pricing, the analogue of (18) is
pa
t   pt =
1 X
s=0
(syt s +  s(t s   "t s)) (21)
where the lags of the overall in
ation in ruble terms in the second sum are replaced with the
corresponding lags of the overall in
ation in dollar terms, which equals to the former minus the
rate of ruble depreciation, "t.
We can test equations (18) and (21) by estimating the following panel-data regressions:
pa




i;t l   pt l) +
2 X
l=0
(blyi;t l + clt l) + t (22)
for ruble cities and
pa




i;t l   pt l) +
2 X
l=0
(blyi;t l + cl(t l   "t l)) + t (23)
for dollar cities separately and estimating ^ 0 = ^ b0 and ^  0 = ^ c0. The estimated regressions are
shown in Table 3.
The table shows that the sticky information model enjoys only weak support of econometric
tests. The most important problem is that the coecients dier markedly between dollar and ruble
cities. The coecients in front of lagged relative price are of opposite sign, in one case both being
10Table 4: Testing the 




All dollar cities (aggregate income) -0.453
(0.134)
All ruble cities (aggregate income) 1.089
(0.078)
All dollar cities (regional income) -0.199
(0.082)
All ruble cities (regional income) 0.803
(0.049)
signicantly dierent from zero. The coecients in front of current in
ation are of the same sign
but very dierent between dollar and ruble cities, which suggests that the sticky information model
can't be the unied model that explains dierences between the two cities. At the same time, most
of the coecients are of the expected sign, and hence the model cannot be rejected outright.
Intuition also suggests that sticky information is unlikely to account for the dierences observed
between the two groups of cities. The prices in this model are completely 
exible, and information
was likely to be the same in all cities. Hence, we would expect that prices to behave identically
as well. After all, it is hard to believe that is cities where apartments are priced in dollars people
noticed the nancial crisis dierently than in the other cities.
5 Flexible prices
If the prices were 
exible then we would expect the price level to be equal to the desired price at
all times, and hence demand for the apartments to remain at a constant level, q. This level is equal
to the demand at the natural level of total income. Thus, under 
exible prices, equation (2) takes
the form:
qt = yt   
(pa
t   pt) = q (24)
Equation (24) can be tested by regressing the relative, or real price for apartments on the real
income:
pa
t   pt = a + byt + t: (25)
The estimated xed-eect panel-data regressions are reported in Table 4. We see that the
coecient of real income is positive and signicant for ruble cities while negative and signicant
for dollar cities. Obviously, this nding is not compatible with equation (24), which implies that
both the sign and the value of the real income coecients must be the same in both cases. Hence,
the 
exible price assumption has to be dismissed outright, as seems intuitive from Figure 2.
116 Conclusions
Behavior of apartment prices in dierent Russian cities following the devaluation in August 1998
clearly lends support to the hypothesis that prices on this market are sticky, and price formation is
backward-looking rather than forward looking. In the cities, where the apartments are commonly
priced in dollars, apartment prices responded slowly to the falling income, so they turned out to
be relatively high comparing to the overall price level. In the cities, where apartments are priced
in rubles, dollar equivalents of these prices fell dramatically on impact in September 1998, and
remained low through the next three years. They then recovered faster when income picked up.
Both common sense and formal testing performed in this paper show that such behavior is not
consistent with 
exible prices, nor it is consistent with sticky information models: clearly, people
in all cities had the same information about what was happening. What was going on is that every
apartment oered on the market was priced according to the average price on the market at the
time and the price remained xed for a certain time period. Hence, the prices changed slowly in
the currency, in which they were denominated. The rapid devaluation of the ruble, on the other
hand, forced a dramatic fall in the dollar-equivalent of the ruble-denominated apartment prices.
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